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[2015년 제 4차] Closing Price Manipulation in Call Auctions: Eviden

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The Hong Kong Stock Exchange briefly adopted call auctions as its closing mechanism. Although prices were on average more informative in a closing auction procedure than in a random closing procedure, they were more prone to manipulation attempts. We find that overnight price reversal is more pronounced on days when manipulation is likely to occur in a closing auction procedure - e.g., days when large price changes during the final 10-minute interval occur; days when sniping attacks occur; days when CBBCs expire; and days when the 24-tick rule is violated.

Keywords: Price Manipulation, Call Auction, Price Reversal, Sniping
JEL Classification: D44, G14
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10-3_Closing_Price_Manipulation_in_Call_Auctions-_Evidence_from_the_Hong_Kong_Stock_Exchange.pdf
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