학회소식
[2018년 제 4차] Restricting CEO Pay Backfires: Evidence from China
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 48
게시일 :
2018-12-14
Using the pay restriction imposed on CEOs of centrally administered state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) in China in 2009, we study the effects of limiting CEO pay. Compared with firms not subject to the restriction, the CEOs of CSOEs experience a significant pay cut. Pay-performance sensitivity for these firms also significantly decreases. In response to the pay cut, CEOs increase their consumption of perks and siphon off firm resources for their own benefit. Ultimately, the performance of these firms dropssignificantly following the pay restriction. Our findings suggest that restricting CEO pay distorts CEO incentives and brings unintended consequences. Our findings caution against limiting the pay of CEOs.
