This study examines how an antitrust law enactment affects merger and acquisition (M&A) performance, especially focusing on M&As occurred within industry. Using the staggered introduction of competition laws across 20 countries, we find an antitrust law adoption decreases an acquirer’s 5- day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding a horizontal merger announcement, compared to those in the benchmark groups. The law adoptions are effective in empowering a regulatory agency and deterring anticompetitive mergers and cross-company coordination. The subdued gain from a horizontal merger under antitrust laws is driven by the lower potential for post-merger monopolistic gain, evidenced by decreases in deal value, target book asset, and announcement returns of an acquirer’s industry-peers. The change in post-merger cost efficiency or agency problems under merger control does not explain our results. Overall, we find that antitrust policies are effective in deterring post-merger monopolistic gain, potentially improving customer welfare.
Keywords: antitrust law; merger control; horizontal M&A; market power
JEL classification: G14; G34