We highlight that the inalienable nature of human capital can crucially determine corporate payouts. Exploiting the staggered rejections of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) across 15 U.S. states as exogenous shocks that potentially increase the mobility of key talents, we find that treatment firms increase payouts relative to control firms following the rejections of the IDD. The baseline effects are more pronounced among firms with more reliance on key human capital, better corporate governance, lower risk, and greater product market competition. These findings suggest that higher payouts not only enable shareholders of financially healthy focal firms to deter the capture of economic rents by key talents that threaten to leave, but also serve as a predation tool to stimulate key talent outflows from financially unhealthy peer competitors.
JEL Code: G38; G18; G14
Key Words: Corporate Payout; Human Capital; Key Talent; Corporate Governance; Predation