This paper aims to explore price differences for dual class equity in terms of corporate governance in Korea. Using longitudinal data from the Korean stock market during 2004-2013, the study examines the direct and interaction effect of corporate governance on voting premium and aims to sift out what is significantly related to voting premium among corporate governance factors including shareholder protection, board independence, managerial transparency, audit, and profit distribution. The empirical study suggests that corporate governance is positively related to voting premium in Korea, shareholder protection and profit distribution among which are the most significant indicators of price differences for duel class equity. We also find that the ownership of domestic block holders is likely to mitigate the impact of shareholder protection on voting premium, whereas the negative relation between profit distribution and voting premium is further reinforced by ownership of domestic blockholders. This study provides clues to the extant diverse findings with regard to voting premium, while offering a key to understanding in that corporate governance plays a pivotal role in retaining intrinsic value of voting rights in the Korean stock market.

 Keywords: Voting premium, Corporate governance, Shareholder protection, Duel class equity