Keywords: tournament incentives, non-CEO executives, gender, firm performance
JEL Classification: M52, M41, M12, J31
학회소식
[2019년 제 4차] Tournament Incentives and Firm Performance: Does Gender Matter?
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 47
게시일 :
2019-12-12
In this study, we integrate two approaches to understand non-CEO executives’ response to CEO tournament incentives: tournament theory and gender role theory. Given the increasing number of firms that are becoming gender diverse in their top management team, we examine whether the association between tournament incentives and firm performance is dependent of non-CEO executives’ gender composition. Using 3,160 firm-year observations in the U.S. from 2007 to 2016, we provide evidence that tournament incentives are motivational for all-male teams whereas such incentives do not work in mixed-gender teams. In additional analyses, we find that sub-group’s tournament incentives in mixed-gender team are motivational but only under specific conditions (e.g., female executives’ tournament incentives in mixed-gender team have motivational effect only when the CEO is a female). These empirical findings confirm the differences in males’ and females’ behavioural responses to competition found in laboratory experiments and field studies, indicating that tournament incentives are beneficial only when a firm’s non-CEO executives consist of single gender individuals, with implications for the design of executive compensation.
