Exploiting the events of the staggered adoption of the IDD injunction grants across the U.S. state courts as a way to measure quasi-exogenous changes in the CEOs’ outside job opportunities, we examine the impacts of managerial career concerns on corporate ESG actions. We find that, when the IDD is adopted (rejected) by the court in the state where the parent company is based, firms increase (decrease) in toxic chemical emissions from the production facilities they own. The baseline results are more pronounced when firms are experiencing poor financial performance, suggesting that the concerns about losing their current jobs (i.e., downside career concerns) induce the CEOs to prioritize short-term financial performance over longer-term value considerations. Additionally, the results are stronger when the CEOs are early in their career, which validates the channel of managerial career concerns. The tighter firms’ financial constraints are, the larger the effects of increase in toxic emissions. Overall, the results highlight the role of implicit managerial labor market incentives on corporate ESG actions.